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A Theory of Strategic Diffusion  
Summary 
The important role of friends, neighbors and colleagues in shaping individual choices 
has been brought out in a number of studies over the years. The presence of significant 
‘local’ influence in shaping individual behavior suggests that firms, governments and 
developmental agencies should explicitly incorporate it in the design of their marketing 
and developmental strategies. This paper develops a framework for the study of optimal 
strategies in the presence of social interaction. 
We focus on the case of a single player who exerts costly effort to get a set of 
individuals – engaged in social interaction – to choose a certain action. Our formulation 
allows for different types of social interaction (ranging from sharing of information to 
direct adoption externalities) and also allows for the player to have incomplete 
information concerning the connections among individuals. The analysis starts by 
showing that incorporating information on social interaction can have large effects on 
the profits of a player. We then show that an increase in the level and dispersion of 
social interaction can raise or lower the optimal strategy and profits of the player, 
depending on the content of the interaction. We then study the value of social network 
information for the player and find that it depends on the dispersion in social 
connections. The economic interest of these results is illustrated via a discussion of two 
economic applications: advertising in the presence of word of mouth communication 
and seeding a network. 
 
Keywords: Social Interaction, Seeding the Network, Word of Mouth Communication, 
Diffusion Strategy 
 
JEL classification: D8, L15 
 
We thank Paul Belleflamme, Ken Burdett, Vincent Buskens, Bhaskar Dutta, Drew 
Fudenberg, Giullaume Haerenger, Daniel Hojman, Willemien Kets, Ana Mauleon, 
Markus Mobius, Arun Sudararajan, Ben Zissimos, Vincent Vannetelbosch, and seminar 
participants at Birkbeck, CORE (Louvain, Essex, Gersenzee, and Harvard for useful 
comments. We also thank the ESRC for financial support via Grant RES-000-22-1901. 
This paper was presented at the 12th Coalition Theory Network Workshop organised by 
the Center for Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE) of the Université 




Address for correspondence: 
 
Sanjeev Goyal 
Faculty of Economics 
University of Cambridge 
Sidgwick Avenue 
Cambridge,CB3 9DD  
UK 
Phone: +44 0 1223 335204  
E-mail: sgoyal@essex.ac.uk, sg472@cam.ac.uk 1 Introduction
In making their choices individuals use personally gathered information along with the
information they get from their acquaintances. The important role of friends, neigh-
bors and colleagues in shaping individual choices has been brought out in a number
of studies over the years.1 The presence of signiﬁcant ‘local’ inﬂuence in shaping indi-
vidual behavior suggests that ﬁrms, governments and developmental agencies should
explicitly incorporate local information sources into their marketing strategy.
Indeed, the popularity of the expression word of mouth communication reﬂects the
fact that both academics as well as practitioners are aware of the potential importance
of local inﬂuence.2 The use of social networks in commercial marketing is increasingly
popular and has given rise to the term viral marketing: a marketing strategy which
takes advantages of existing networks of inﬂuence among consumers to generate a
large product demand with limited advertising resources.3 Similarly, governmental
and developmental agencies has coined the expression peer-leading interventions to
describe social programmes which attempt to reduce risky behavior by exploiting the
presence of network eﬀects.4
Local social inﬂuence is, however, a nebulous concept and it has been resistant to
formal treatment. Two diﬃculties are worth noting. The ﬁrst diﬃculty is a conceptual
one. Networks of social relationships overlap in complicated ways and have a number
of diﬀerent dimensions. The need is for a way to deﬁne patterns of relationships that
1For example, Coleman (1966) presents evidence on how a doctor’s prescription of new drugs
was inﬂuenced by his location in communication networks. Conley and Udry (2004) and Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995) present evidence that farmers are inﬂuenced by their neighbors in the choice of
crops and agricultural inputs. In the context of brand and product choice, Feick and Price (1987),
Reingen et al. (1984), Godes and Mayzlin (2004) present evidence for word of mouth communication.
2There are some well known examples in which organizations have tried to target key individuals
in a social context to generate desirable outcomes. For instance, in 2001 the ﬁrm Hasbro, a worldwide
leader in manufacture and marketing of games and toy, collected data on the social network of boys
aged eight to thirteen in Chicago. This data was used to identify 1600 inﬂuential children who were
then the focus of personal advertising and training. For further details on this case, see Tierney
(2001). See Rosen (2000) for detailed discussions on a variety of similar case studies.
3The advent of new communication tools such as email, chat rooms, web sites, allow consumers
to talk with others essentially at no costs. This has led marketers to re-evalute the impact of
network-based marketing strategy as an eﬀective way to market products. Perhaps the best known
case of viral marketing is the rapid adoption of HOTMAIL: almost 12 million people signed up with
Hotmail within eighteen months of its start, and the ﬁrm spent around 50,000 dollars in advertising
the product. For a discussion on the empirical importance of viral marketing see Leskovec, Adamic
and Huberman (2006).
4Organizations often incorporate peer eﬀects in designing policies to promote behavior change,
such as reducing smoking and reducing risk behavior that can lead to sexually transmitted diseases.
See Rogers (2003) and Rosen (2000) for an illustration of diﬀerent case studies. See Valente et
al. (2003) and Kelly et al. (1991) for a discussion about the empirical importance of peer-leading
interventions.
1is simple and also general enough that it captures key intuitions we have about ﬂows
of inﬂuence. The second diﬃculty is a practical one. Firms and other players who
are trying to get individuals to choose certain actions usually do not know a great
deal about the actual structures. Thus, we need a way to think about the design
of marketing or development strategies in a context of incomplete information about
ties that connect individuals.
This paper proposes a general framework which addresses these diﬃculties, and
thereby opens up the study of optimal strategies in contexts characterized by ‘lo-
cal’ inﬂuence. There are two groups of players, M and N. Every member of group
M chooses a strategy with a view to inﬂuencing members of group N to choose
certain actions. The actions taken by members of group M lead to some informa-
tion/resources reaching individuals in N. This information is shared by individuals
in N ‘locally’. This local sharing leads to a new distribution of resources or infor-
mation. Group N members make decisions based on this distribution, which in turn
generates payoﬀs for members in group M. In the present paper we will study the
case in which there is only one player in group M. In a companion paper Galeotti
and Goyal (2006), we study the general case with |M| ≥ 1.
Two aspects of social interaction are important in our study. The ﬁrst aspect is the
level of social interaction. Do individuals have many friends or few friends, and is the
distribution of friends even or is it characterized by inequality with some individuals
having many friends while others have only a few? We will model levels of social
interaction via the distribution of connections that individuals have. The number of
connections of an individual will be termed her degree and we will study the eﬀects
of the degree distribution on optimal strategy and proﬁts. The degree distribution
summarizes a large amount of information about the network in a very simple and
natural way. It also allows to formalize ideas about adding links or redistributing
links in the network. The notion of adding links to a network is studied in terms
of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance relations, while the idea of redistributing links is
formalized in terms of second order stochastic dominance relations.5
The second aspect is the content of social interaction. Inter-personal interaction is
important due to two types of factors: information sharing and adoption externalities.
Information sharing about prices and quality of products is important in shaping
demand for them. In the case of products such as fax machines, softwares and e-mail,
the rewards to an individual depend on how many others adopt the product. Our
5Many processes governing network formation exhibit stochastic dominance relationships as pa-
rameters describing the underlying process are altered. For example, in Jackson and Rogers (2006)
links between nodes occur both at a random base and at a network base (local network search). The
authors show that by changing the random-network ratio the resulting degree distributions can be
ordered in the sense of stochastic dominance.
2model allows for both these types of interaction.6
Our analysis addresses the following questions:
1. How do changes in the network of relations – adding links to some players or
redistributing links among members of N – aﬀect optimal strategies and proﬁts?
2. How does additional information on the network aﬀect optimal strategies and
proﬁts?
3. How does the content of interaction mediate the relation between social inter-
action and proﬁts?
Our analysis brings out three general points. First, we show that incorporating
information on social interaction can have large eﬀects on the proﬁts of a player M.
Thus it is important for ﬁrms and governments to take social interaction seriously.
Second, we show that an increase in the level and dispersion of social interaction can
increase or decrease the strategy and proﬁts of player M; the eﬀect depends on the
content of the interaction. Therefore players like ﬁrms and governments should pay
attention to the type of interaction as well as the level of social interaction in designing
their strategies. Third, we show that the dispersion of connections determines the
value of additional information on connections. This means that player M should
be willing to pay more for details of network information in contexts with greater
dispersion in social connections.
The economic interest of these ﬁndings is illustrated via a detailed analysis of two
prominent economic applications: advertising in the presence of word of mouth com-
munication and product introduction in the presence of adoption externalities. In
the information sharing example, there is a ﬁrm advertising to a group of consumers,
who share product information among themselves.7 Potential buyers are not aware of
the existence of the product and the ﬁrm undertakes costly informative advertising.
Consumers share the information they receive from the ﬁrm with their friends and
neighbors. In particular, we suppose that each individual draws a sample of k others
from N and gets information that these k individuals have received from the ﬁrm.8
In the adoption externalities example, we study how a ﬁrm can optimally induce the
adoption of a new product in a context with local interaction. Suppose individuals
buy the product only if all their social contacts have already adopted the product.
6Indeed, one of the main arguments of the paper is precisely to show that the eﬀects of the
changes in levels of social interaction on optimal strategy and proﬁts depend very much on the
content of the interaction. See Propositions 4.1-4.4.
7Our model combines the formulation of advertising from Butters (1977) with the word of mouth
communication formulation from Ellison and Fudenberg (1995).
8This k is allowed to vary across individuals and the variation is captured by a degree distribution.
3There are two periods, 1 and 2. In period 1 no individual will buy the product and
to generate demand in period 2, the ﬁrm must seed the network: distribute some free
samples of the product in period 1.9
We illustrate one set of implications of our general results: proﬁts are increasing
in level but decreasing in the dispersion of social interaction in the word of mouth
communication application. The opposite pattern obtains in the model with adoption
externalities. Proﬁts are decreasing in the level and increasing in the dispersion of
social interaction! Thus the content of interaction plays a key role in mediating the
relation between social interaction and payoﬀs. Similarly, contrasting implications
also arise with regard to the eﬀects of social interaction on optimal strategy.
We now place our paper in perspective. There is a large literature on optimal ﬁrm
strategies with regard to advertising and the adoption of goods with adoption exter-
nalities.10 Similarly there is a large literature on local interaction both with regard to
word of mouth communication and with regard to adoption in the presence of local
externalities.11 The principal contribution of our paper is a simple model in which
interaction can involve local information sharing or local adoption externalities and
ﬁrms incorporate the local interaction explicitly in their choice of optimal inﬂuence
strategies.12 Our paper thus bridges these two literatures. The analysis shows that
this model is tractable and that it yields a number of insights into how the content
and level of social interaction jointly shape optimal strategies and proﬁts.
Our paper is related to two recent papers which study optimal strategies in the face
of local interaction, Ballester et al. (2006) and Banerji and Dutta (2006). Ballester
et al. (2006) study a model in which individuals located in a network choose actions
(criminal activities) which aﬀect the payoﬀs of other individuals within the network.
They examine the question: which individuals should be eliminated from the network
if the objective is to minimize crime? This problem is related to the issue of targeting
which we study. Banerji and Dutta (2006) study a setting where ﬁrms sell to con-
sumers located on a network and there are local adoption externalities. Their interest
is in characterizing networks which can sustain diﬀerent technologies in equilibrium.
Ballester et al (2006) and Banerji and Dutta (2006) both assume that the network is
9Active seeding strategies are widely used in practice. For a discussion of a number of case studies
see Rosen (2005).
10For early work on advertising see Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984). For early
work on ﬁrms in markets with adoption externalities, see Farrell and Saloner (1986), Rolfs (1975),
and Katz and Shapiro (1986); for a recent survey, see Shy (2001).
11For local learning and word of mouth communication, see Bala and Goyal (1998), Ellison and
Fudenberg (1993,1995); for a survey of this work see Goyal (2005). For local interaction and adoption
externalities see Ellison (2003), and Morris (2000). For a general treatment of games with local
externalities, see Galeotti et. al. (2006), Jackson and Yariv (2006), and Sundararajan (2006).
12As we have mentioned in the introduction above the companion paper Galeotti and Goyal (2006)
studies the case of competition among ﬁrms.
4common knowledge among the players. By contrast, we study a model in which the
network is imperfectly known and we are then led to a study of networks in terms of
degree distributions, something which is quite distinct from these two papers.
Section 2 presents a basic model of strategic diﬀusion. Section 3 develops the main
ideas of our paper via a detailed discussion of the information sharing example. Sec-
tion 4 analyzes the general model. Section 5 presents two extensions which allow for
targeted strategies and the presence of opinion leaders. Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic Model
We study the problem of a player M who exerts costly eﬀort with a view to get-
ting a group of individuals to choose an action. Individual behavior is inﬂuenced
by social interaction. There are two dimensions of social interaction which will be
relevant in our paper. The ﬁrst dimension concerns the content of the interaction.
Broadly speaking social interaction may involve sharing of valuable information and
adoption externalities. Our model accommodates both these aspects; see example
2.1-2.2 below. The second dimension is about who meets whom, i.e., the distribution
of personal connections. The analysis will examine how these two dimensions, the
content of interaction and the distribution of connections, shape the optimal strategy
of player M and the level of surpluses that she can hope to earn. We now get into
the details of the model.13
There is a unit measure of individuals N = [0,1]. Individuals are located in a social
network and in principle the structure of the network can be complex and take on
a variety of forms. However, M has limited knowledge about this network. We will
model the beliefs of M about this network as follows: she knows the proportions
of individuals having diﬀerent levels of social interaction. We now elaborate on this
formulation.
For an individual i ∈ N, the level of social interaction is parameterized by a number
k, where k is termed the degree. We will suppose that each individual draws k others
with probability P(k) ≥ 0, k ∈ {1,2,...,¯ k} = O and
P
k∈O P(k) = 1. She uses an
(atomless) uniform distribution on the unit interval to pick her sample. So, if she has
a k sized sample, she makes k draws, and each draw is independent.14 Now suppose
that the draw of the sample size is independent across individuals. We can then say
13It is important to emphasize that heterogeneities in the level of social interaction across individ-
uals has a very diﬀerent eﬀect on individual behavior and on optimal strategies of the external player
as compared to individual heterogeneities with regard to willingness to play; see the Appendix for a
detailed discussion on this point.
14The probability of drawing the same person two or more times is zero, given that there is a
continuum of individuals.
5that there is fraction P(k) of individuals who choose a k sized sample.15 We will
refer to P as the degree distribution: the player M knows this distribution.16 Deﬁne
ˆ k =
P
k∈O P(k)k as the average degree of social interaction.
We will suppose that M knows P and chooses an action x ∈ [0,1]. Let the proﬁts
from an individual inﬂuenced by k others be given by φk(x), where φk(·) : [0,1] → R;
assume that φk(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, for every k ∈ O. The expected




P(k)φk(x) − C(α,x), (1)
where C(α,·) : [0,1] → R is the cost of eﬀort and the parameter α ≥ 0 indicates the
eﬃciency in generating eﬀorts.
We now make a number of remarks on the scope of this framework. First we discuss
the continuum of individuals formulation. The continuum formulation allows us to
move from the distribution of sample sizes at the individual level to the fraction
of individuals with a certain degree easily. It also simpliﬁes the exposition of the
arguments in some places. Second we note that the atom-less uniform distribution
assumption is convenient, but the framework allows for a non-uniform draw of samples
as well. Indeed, section 5.2 extends the model to allow for heterogeneities in the
probability of being drawn. It is also worth noting an implication of the atomless
distribution: the probability of two individuals picking a common partner is zero.
In other words, it rules out any clustering in the network. Thus, in our framework,
we would need probability distributions with atoms if we want to study clustering.
Third, we have written the payoﬀs in terms of individual degree, but the framework
allows for indirect social interaction eﬀects: for instance, it is easy to accommodate
indirect ﬂow of information from i to j to k (on this issue also see the discussion in
word of mouth application below).
We are now ready to introduce our two leading economic examples.
Example 2.1 Word of mouth communication
Consider a ﬁrm advertising to a group of consumers, who share product information
among themselves. The model here combines the formulation of advertising from
Butters (1977) with the word of mouth communication formulation from Ellison and
Fudenberg (1995).17 Player M is a monopolist selling a good at price 1; the cost of
15Note that we are invoking a variant of the law of large numbers here.
16See section 5.1 for a discussion of a model in which the player M knows more about the pattern
of personal connections.
17Our modeling of advertising also draws on Grossman and Shapiro (1984), who extend Butter
(1977) to study advertising when ﬁrms market horizontally diﬀerentiated products. For recent
empirical work on the importance of word of mouth communication in the diﬀusion of products, see
Mobius, Niehaus and Rosenblat (2006).
6producing the good is zero. The set of buyers is N = [0,1]; each buyer has inelastic
demand and her reservation value for the object is v = 1. Suppose ﬁrst that potential
buyers are not aware of the existence of the product and the monopolist undertakes
costly informative advertising. The case where consumers are aware of the product
but do not know the quality of the product can be modeled similarly, and leads to
very similar payoﬀs and incentives for the ﬁrm. This formulation is developed in
detail in the appendix A.
The monopolist chooses x ∈ [0,1]; this is the fraction of individuals in N who receive
advertisements. Let the cost of eﬀort x be αx2/2, where α > 0. A buyer buys either
if she receives the advertisement from the monopolist or if she receives information
via word of mouth communication from her cohort. In this example, a buyer with
degree k contacts k other consumers, from whom she obtains information about the
product, if any. It then follows that if the monopolist chooses x, her expected proﬁts
from a k degree buyer are:
φk(x) = 1 − (1 − x)
k+1. (2)
This is the probability that a consumer with k friends becomes aware of the product.
For simplicity, we are assuming that individuals obtain information only from their
direct neighbors. Suppose now that information ﬂows two steps, i.e., the radius is
2. To ﬁx ideas suppose that every individual has degree k. In this case it is easy to
check that φk(x) = 1 − (1 − x)k2+1, which exhibits the same properties as expression
2. It is easy to check that φk(x) is increasing and concave in x as well as in k. Thus
our framework and the methods of analysis can be extended in a natural way to cover
richer patterns of information diﬀusion.











Example 2.2 Seeding the network18
In some interesting contexts, the returns from adopting a product depend on whether
others do likewise. Well known examples of products which display adoption exter-
nalities include fax machines, software programmes, telephones and e-mail accounts.
Let us consider the case of a new product and ask how a ﬁrm can optimally induce
its adoption in a context with local interaction.
18This example is inspired by discussions with Arun Sundararajan. We thank him for his com-
ments.
7Suppose individuals use the following simple decision rule. They buy the product
only if all their social contacts have already adopted the product.19 Suppose there
are two periods, 1 and 2. Under our assumptions, in period 1 no individual will buy
the product. To generate demand in period 2, the ﬁrm can seed the network: it
can distribute some free samples of the product in period 1. Let x ∈ [0,1] be the
fraction of individuals who are sent free samples. Assume that consumer beneﬁts
from adoption are v > 1 in case all their neighbors adopt and 0 otherwise. Also
assume that the ﬁrm sets a price equal to 1 in period 2. The expected returns to the
monopolist from a k degree individual are then given by:
φk(x) = (1 − x)x
k.
This is simply the probability that a consumer does not receive the product for free
and that all the k individuals she interacts with did receive the free sample. It can
be checked that φk(x) is increasing and convex for low x, and decreasing and concave
for large x, and that it is decreasing and convex in k. The expected proﬁts to a






The direct cost of production and dissemination of samples is zero, but a free sample
has an implicit cost for the monopolist since a consumer who gets a free product does
not buy at a positive price later. It is easy to see that expected proﬁts at x = 0 and
at x = 1 equal 0. Further, the expected proﬁts are positive for every x ∈ (0,1). 
The examples illustrate how diﬀerent aspects of social interaction can be accommo-
dated within our framework. We now introduce a few concepts which help us in
studying changes in the levels of social interaction.
An increase in the level of social interaction is modeled in terms of ﬁrst order stochas-
tic shifts in the degree distribution (FOSD). We are also interested in the role of the
dispersion of social interaction. Changes in dispersion are studied in terms of second
order stochastic shifts in the degree distribution. When studying increasing disper-
sion, we will focus on mean preserving spreads of distributions (MPS). While these
concepts are standard, we present them here for easy reference. In what follows, P
and P 0 are distinct degree distributions deﬁned on O. Given a degree distribution P,
19This decision rule is reasonable if there is a status quo technology which everyone uses and a
switch to a new technology is justiﬁed only if communication with the new technology is possible
with everyone. Consider a school which sends messages to parents via post, and is considering
switching to e-mail. It will switch to e-mail only if every parent can be reached via e-mail. We also
emphasize that our ﬁndings can be generalized to a situation in which individuals adopt the product
if a suﬃciently large fraction of their neighbors adopt the new technology.





Deﬁnition 2.1 P 0 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) P if and only if P0(k) ≤
P(k) for every k ∈ {1,2,..,¯ k}.








for every y ∈ {1,2,...¯ k}.
Deﬁnition 2.3 P 0 is a mean preserving spread of P if and only if P and P 0 have the
same mean and P second order stochastically dominates P 0.
This completes the description of the model we now turn to a study of the eﬀects of
the content of interaction, which is captured by the function φ, and the distribution
of connections P, on the optimal strategy, x∗, and proﬁts, Π(x∗|P).
3 Optimal advertising with word of mouth com-
munication
In this section we develop some of the main ideas of our paper via a detailed discus-
sion of optimal advertising in the presence of word of mouth communication among
consumers.
We start with a preliminary enquiry into the potential advantages of using word of
mouth communication. Perhaps the simplest way to do this is to compare the proﬁts
under a strategy which ignores word of mouth communication with proﬁts under a
strategy that optimally responds to word of mouth distribution. To ﬁx ideas suppose
that α = 1 and that everyone draws the same sample size k. Then the optimal
strategy of a ﬁrm which ignores word of mouth advertising is to set x = 1. The
proﬁts under this strategy are Π(1) = 1/2. On the other hand, the optimal strategy








We can substitute this strategy in the proﬁts to get the proﬁts under optimal strat-
egy. Denote this proﬁt by Π(x∗
k). Figure 1 plots the percentage advantages, i.e.,
[Π(x∗
k)−Π(1)]/Π(1), from incorporating word of mouth communication in the design
9of advertising strategy. The ﬁgure shows that if k ≥ 10 then optimally responding to
word of mouth communication can lead to a 80% increase in proﬁts!
Having established that a ﬁrm can make substantial gains in proﬁts by incorporating
word of mouth communication in its marketing strategy, we now examine the ways
in which optimal strategy and proﬁts vary with the level and dispersion in word of
mouth communication.
We start with the eﬀects of an increase in word of mouth communication. As indi-
viduals talk to more people two forces are at work. On the one hand, a potential
buyer with more connections is more likely to hear about the product from neigh-
bors. In this sense, advertising and word of mouth communication may be viewed as
substitutes. On the other hand, a higher degree of social communication means that
for any advertisement there are now more people who hear about it through word
of mouth communication. In this sense social communication and advertising are
complements. The eﬀects of an increase in the level of word of mouth communication
will therefore depend on which of these two eﬀects will prevail.
If advertising technology is ineﬃcient (i.e., α is large), then optimal x is small and few
consumers receive advertisements. Consequently it is unlikely that a person will hear
about it from others even if she has more contacts. This suggests that the second
positive eﬀect dominates. In contrast, when the advertising technology is eﬃcient
(i.e., α is low), the monopolist chooses high x. Since many consumers hear directly
about the product, an increase in word of mouth makes it much more likely that an
uninformed buyer will hear about the product via word of mouth and this lowers the
incentives for the ﬁrm to advertise. The following result summarizes these ideas.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that P 0 FOSD P. There exist αP and ¯ αP, with 0 < αP ≤
¯ αP, such that if α < αP then x∗
P ≥ x∗
P0, while if α > ¯ αP then x∗
P ≤ x∗
P0.





= (1 − x
∗
P)
k [1 + (k + 1)ln(1 − x
∗
P)].
For suﬃciently low x∗
P the marginal returns are increasing in k, while for suﬃciently
high x∗













and it is easy to see that x∗
P is decreasing in α and that x∗
P → 0 when α → ∞, while
x∗
P → 1 when α → 0. The proof is completed by noting that P 0 FOSD P and that
Π(x|P) is concave in x. 
10The eﬀects of greater word of mouth communication on ﬁrm’s proﬁts are straightfor-
ward. Suppose the ﬁrm keeps the advertisement constant. Then the costs remain the
same, but an increase in word of mouth communication means that more potential
buyers will hear about the product and so revenue will increase. Clearly this will
also hold when the ﬁrm reacts optimally to the new word of mouth communication
regime. The following result summarizes this argument.
Proposition 3.2 Firm’s proﬁts are increasing with the level of word of mouth com-
munication.
Proof: Start with some x∗










where the ﬁrst inequality follows because φk(·) is increasing in k and P 0 FOSD P,
while the second inequality follows from the optimality of x∗
P0, under P 0. 
We would like to brieﬂy discuss an issue relating to viral marketing now. An important
element in viral marketing is the idea that information can be passed on from person
to person via social connections. However, in our example we have considered that
word of mouth communication decays just after one step. This assumption is valid
when advertisement is about information which is only valuable for a short length of
time, such as discounts, sales and last-minute oﬀers. When the information injected
in the network is more stable, it is appropriate to allow for indirect information
transmission across neighbor or neighbors’ neighbor etc. In our model, expanding
the radius of information ﬂow is analogous to an increase in the level of sample sizes
drawn by everyone. Thus Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 also address the issue of expanding
radius of communication.
We now turn to the eﬀects of greater dispersion in word of mouth communication.
The simplest way to study this is to consider the case of a mean preserving spread
in word of mouth communication. The optimal response depends on whether the
marginal returns to advertisements are concave or convex in the degrees. If they
are concave then greater dispersion implies a fall in expected marginal returns and
under the concavity of returns with respect to advertisement this means that optimal
advertisement goes down. The converse holds if the marginal returns are convex in
degrees. The following result summarizes these ideas.
Proposition 3.3 Given a P, there exists ˜ αP and ˜ ˜ αP, with 0 < ˜ αP ≤ ˜ ˜ αP, such that
if α < ˜ αP then marginal returns are convex in k, while if α > ˜ ˜ αP then marginal
returns are concave in k. Consequently, optimal eﬀorts increase (decline) with mean
preserving spread of word of mouth communication if α < ˜ αP and decline if α > ˜ ˜ αP.
11Proof: We can write the second derivative of the marginal returns with respect to k




∂x∂k2 = (1 − x
∗
P)
k ln(1 − x)[2 + (k + 1)ln(1 − x
∗
P)]
For suﬃciently low x∗
P this expression is negative while for suﬃciently high x∗
P it is
positive. This means that marginal returns are concave in k for small x∗
P and convex
in k for large x∗
P. The proof now follows from the observation that x∗
P is decreasing
in α, and that x∗
P → 0 when α → ˆ k + 1, while x∗
P → 1 when α → 0. 
We now turn to the eﬀects of greater dispersion in word of mouth communication
on ﬁrm’s proﬁts. Here the intuition is quite simple: the value of sampling others is
increasing but concave in the size of the sample. Consequently, greater dispersion has
the eﬀect of lowering the potential for proﬁts. The following result summarizes this
intuition.
Proposition 3.4 Firm proﬁts are falling with greater dispersion in word of mouth
communication.









where the ﬁrst inequality follows because φk(·) is concave in k and P 0 is a mean
preserving spread of P, while the second inequality follows by optimality of x∗
P, under
P. 
4 General results in the basic model
The analysis of the word of mouth communication example yields a number of in-
teresting results on how optimal strategy and proﬁts depend on word of mouth com-
munication. We now use the intuitions gained to develop general results on how
social interaction aﬀects optimal strategies. The general results we develop in this
section highlight the important point that the eﬀects of increasing social interaction
or greater dispersion in social interaction on optimal strategy depend very much on
the content of the interaction. In particular, we will show that the eﬀects of so-
cial interaction on optimal strategies and proﬁts are very diﬀerent in the seeding the
networks application.
We start by formally stating the key properties of the returns function φk(·) and the
cost function C(α,x):
12Concavity of returns in eﬀort :∀x ∈ [0,1], ∀k ∈ O,
∂2φk(x)
∂x2 ≤ 0 (R.1)
Convexity of returns in eﬀort :∀x ∈ [0,1], ∀k ∈ O,
∂2φk(x)
∂x2 ≥ 0 (R.10)
The cost function C(·,·) satisﬁes standard properties; it is increasing and convex in
x and also increasing in α.








∂x2 > 0. (C.1)
Denote the optimal strategy under a degree distribution P by x∗
P. Throughout this
section, we will assume that for any P, there exists an interior optimal strategy
x∗
P ∈ (0,1). It is worth noting that in the word of mouth communication model and
in the seeding the network model, the optimal strategy is always interior.
Recall that we measure an increase in social interaction in terms of a ﬁrst order
stochastic shift in the distribution P. The following result shows that the eﬀects of
increasing social interaction depend on whether the function φ displays increasing
or decreasing marginal returns with respect to degree. It is useful to deﬁne these
properties of φk(·) formally.
Deﬁnition 4.1 The function φ exhibits increasing marginal returns in degree (IMRD)
if for all x > x0 and k < ¯ k: φk+1(x) − φk+1(x0) ≥ φk(x) − φk(x0). Analogously, the
function φ exhibits decreasing marginal returns in degree (DMRD) if for all x > x
0
and k < ¯ k: φk+1(x) − φk+1(x0) ≤ φk(x) − φk(x0).
Denote the optimal strategy under P and P 0 by x∗
P and x∗
P0, respectively. We can
now state our ﬁrst result on eﬀects of social interaction.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose the payoﬀs are given by (1) and satisfy (R.1) and (C.1).































13Now (R.1) and (C.1) together imply that the expected returns function is strictly
concave in x for x ∈ (0,1], and so x∗
P0 ≥ x∗
P. The proof for the DMRD case is
analogous and omitted. 
Remark 1: It is easy to see that this result can be strengthened and holds so long
as IMRD (DMRD) holds at the optimum x∗
P.
Recall that in the word of mouth communication model we showed that IMRD and
DMRD obtain depending on whether the costs of advertising are large or small. Thus
optimal strategy will increase with increase in social interaction if costs are high but
fall if they are low. The value of the result lies in identifying a simple property of
the returns function as being key to understanding how the level of social interaction
aﬀects optimal strategy. So as an example, consider the seeding the network model.
For the case of equal samples k, the marginal returns are increasing in degree, i.e.,
IMRD obtains. The above result then immediately implies that optimal seeding
increases with social interaction.20
We now turn to the eﬀects of increasing social interaction on the proﬁts of player M.
The following result shows that the eﬀects of a ﬁrst order stochastic shift in social
interaction depend on whether the function φ is increasing or decreasing in degree.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose the payoﬀs are given by (1) and P 0 FOSD P.
1. If φk(x) ≥ φk−1(x), ∀x ∈ (0,1), ∀k ∈ O, then Π(x∗
P0|P 0) ≥ Π(x∗
P|P);
2. If φk(x) ≤ φk−1(x), ∀x ∈ (0,1), ∀k ∈ O, then Π(x∗
P0|P 0) ≤ Π(x∗
P|P).
Proof: Start with some x∗










where the ﬁrst inequality follows because φk(·) is increasing in k and P 0 FOSD P,
while the second inequality follows from the optimality of x∗
P0, under P 0. The proof
for the second case follows from analogous arguments and is omitted. 
We have already seen that in the word of mouth communication model the payoﬀ
is increasing in degree. Proposition 4.2 then implies that proﬁts increase with social
interaction. By contrast, in the seeding network model returns are decreasing in
degree, and so Proposition 4.2 immediately implies that proﬁts are falling in the level
of social interaction! This result is relatively easy to obtain in our framework, but it
is worth emphasizing its substantive interest: an increase in social interaction is not
always beneﬁcial for the outside player. The impact on payoﬀs depend very much on
the content of the social interaction.
20Speciﬁcally, it is easy to check that the optimal strategy of the monopolist is given by x∗ =
k/(k + 1), which is increasing in k.
14We next turn to the eﬀects of an increase in dispersion of social interaction. An
examination of the ﬁrst order condition, (3), suggests that the eﬀect of such changes
depend on the curvature of the marginal returns with respect to k.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose the payoﬀs are given by (1), satisfy (R.1) and (C.1), and
that P 0 is a mean preserving spread of P. If the marginal returns are concave (convex)





Proof: Let us start with x∗
P ∈ (0,1). Since P 0 is a mean preserving spread of P and
































Next note that (R.1) and (C.1) together imply that expected payoﬀs are strictly
concave in x for every x ∈ (0,1). This in turn implies x∗
P0 ≤ x∗
P. The proof for the
case where marginal returns are convex in k follows from analogous arguments and
is omitted.

Remark 2: It is easy to see that this result can be strengthened and holds so long
as concavity (convexity) of the marginal returns holds at the optimum x∗
P.
We now ask how proﬁts of the monopolist vary with a mean preserving spread in
social interaction.
Proposition 4.4 Suppose payoﬀs are given by (1) and that P 0 is a mean preserving
spread of P.
1. If φk(x) is concave in k, for all k ∈ O, then Π(x∗
P0|P 0) ≤ Π(x∗
P|P).
2. If φk(x) is convex in k for all k ∈ O, then Π(x∗
P0|P 0) ≥ Π(x∗
P|P).









where the ﬁrst inequality follows because φk(.) is concave in k and P 0 is a mean
preserving spread of P, while the second inequality follows by optimality of x∗
P, under
P. The proof for case 2 is analogous and is omitted. 
15Recall that in the word of mouth communication model payoﬀs are concave in de-
grees, and so Proposition 4.4 immediately implies that proﬁts are falling with greater
dispersion in social interaction. By contrast, in the seeding the network model payoﬀs
are convex in k; Proposition 4.4 then tells us that proﬁts are increasing with disper-
sion in social interaction. Thus the implications of increasing dispersion in proﬁts
goes in opposite directions in the two models. These diﬀerences reiterate the point
we made above: the impact of changes in the dispersion of social interaction on ﬁrm’s
proﬁts is sensitive to the content of social interaction.
5 Extensions
In this section we present two extensions. The ﬁrst extends the benchmark model to a
setting in which player M has additional information on the distribution of personal
connections. The second extension studies optimal advertising when some individuals
in group N are drawn more than others. These individuals are the opinion leaders
or inﬂuencers.
5.1 Targeted Strategies
We now consider a situation in which the player M knows the degree of each indi-
vidual, and is therefore able to target her eﬀort. We would like to understand the
circumstances under which M should target the high or the low degree individuals.
We also examine the relative value of using a targeted strategy as compared to an
un-targeted strategy and how this relates to the nature of social interaction.21
Formally, the monopolist knows the distribution of degrees P and is able to partition
the set N in ¯ k groups. P(k) is the fraction of individuals in group k and individuals
in group k have degree k. Hence, the strategy of the monopolist is a vector x =
(x1,...,x¯ k), where xk ∈ [0,1] indicates the eﬀort that player M targets to group
k ∈ O. It follows that x ∈ [0,1]
¯ k.
A strategy x generates a total eﬀort θ(x) =
P
k∈O P(k)xk. We will consider models in
which expected returns from a k degree individual can be represented as φk(xk,θ(x)).
The expected net proﬁts to the monopolist from a strategy x are:
21The massive quantities of data available on social networks, such as chat rooms, social networking
web-sites, newsgroups, has led to a booming literature on social network data mining in computer
science. Its main objective is to construct algorithms which allow to analyse social network data in
order to determine measures of what is called the network value of customers: the expected increase
in sales to others that results from marketing to that customer. Not surprisingly, the degree of a
node is an important determinant of the network value of a consumer. See Domingos and Richardson




P(k)φk(xk,θ(x)) − C(α,θ(x)) (4)
We now discuss our two examples, word of mouth communication and seeding the
network, in a context where M knows the degree of every individual.
Example 5.1 Word of mouth communication, continued
Given x the expected returns from a k degree consumer are:
φk(xk,θ(x)) = 1 − (1 − xk)(1 − θ(x))
k,
which is the probability that an individual with degree k will be informed either from
direct advertisements or from word of mouth communication.22 Note that φk(xk,θ(x))











Example 5.2 Seeding the network, continued.
In this case the expected returns from an k degree individual are:
φk(xk,θ(x)) = (1 − xk)(θ(x))
k.
This is the probability that an individual with degree k will buy the product in period
2. It may be checked that φk(xk,θ(x)) is concave in the ﬁrst argument. The expected







We say that a strategy x is monotonically increasing in degree if xk+1 ≥ xk for all
k ∈ O \ {¯ k}. A monotonically decreasing strategy in degree is deﬁned similarly. We
now develop simple conditions on the returns function φk(·,·) under which the optimal
strategy is monotonically increasing and decreasing in degree, respectively.
Deﬁnition 5.1 The returns function φk(xk,θ(x)) exhibits IMRD if for all x > x
0
and k < ¯ k, φk+1(x,θ(x)) − φk+1(x0,θ(x)) ≥ φk(x,θ(x)) − φk(x0,θ(x)). Analogously,
the monopolist faces decreasing marginal returns in degree (DMRD) if for all x > x
0
and k < ¯ k, φk+1(x,θ(x)) − φk+1(x0,θ(x)) ≤ φk(x,θ(x)) − φk(x0,θ(x)).
22Note that here we are assuming that consumers sample other consumers randomly from N.
17The following result can now be stated.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose the payoﬀs are given by (4). In addition suppose that the
returns function φ(·,·) satisﬁes concavity in its ﬁrst argument, and that P(k) > 0 for
all k ∈ O.
1. If the returns function φk(.,.) satisﬁes IMRD then the optimal targeted strategy
is monotonically increasing in k.
2. If the returns function φk(.,.) satisﬁes DMRD then the optimal targeted strategy
is monotonically decreasing in k.

















Within the brackets only the ﬁrst term diﬀers across the s. Let x∗ be the optimal
targeted strategy. Suppose there is some s and some x∗
s > 0 such that
dΠ(x∗|P)
dxs ≥ 0.
It then follows from IMRD that the total derivative will be positive at xs0 = xs for all
s0 ≥ s. The result then follows from concavity of the payoﬀ function with respect to
its ﬁrst argument xs for each s. We note that if there is no s with this property then
clearly the result is true. The proof for the DMRD case is analogous and omitted. 
The two conditions on payoﬀs in Proposition 4.1 are restrictive; but they are interest-
ing as they are simple to check and they are satisﬁed by our two examples, word of
mouth communication and seeding the network, respectively. In particular, the word
of mouth example satisﬁes DMRD while the seeding the network satisﬁes IMRD. In
fact the implications of IMRD and DMRD are a little stronger in these examples,
and yield cut-oﬀ optimal strategies.
An increasing cut-oﬀ strategy x has a ˜ k ∈ O such that x˜ k ∈ [0,1], while for all k > ˜ k,
xk = 1 and for all k < ˜ k, xk = 0. A decreasing cut-oﬀ strategy is deﬁned similarly.
The following result covers the two examples.
Corollary 5.1 In the word of mouth communication example the optimal targeted
strategy is a decreasing cut-oﬀ strategy, while in the seeding the network the optimal
targeted strategy is an increasing cut-oﬀ strategy.
Proof: We prove this result for the word of mouth communication model. Similar
arguments can be used to prove the result for the seeding the network model. First
note that the function φk(·,·) in the word of mouth communication example satisﬁes
DMRD and it is concave in its ﬁrst argument. So, we can apply Proposition 5.1 to
18infer that an optimal strategy is monotonically decreasing in degree. Second, the









P(k)k(1 − xk)(1 − θ(x))
k−1 − αθ(x)
#
Suppose x∗ is optimal and that 1 > x∗
s0 ≥ x∗




dxs ≥ 0. However, from DMRD and the fact that the ﬁrst term
(1 − θ(x∗)) only depends on θ(x∗), it follows that
dΠ(x∗|P)
dxs0 > 0. So aggregate payoﬀs
can be strictly increased relative to x∗. This contradicts the hypothesis that x∗ is
optimal, and concludes the argument. 
Corollary 5.1 tells us that when the content of social interaction is about information
sharing, the optimal strategy involves targeting the low degree consumers, as they are
less likely to be informed by their cohort. In contrast, in the adoption externalities
example, high degree consumers are the natural target, as they are unlikely to buy
the product via social inﬂuence and so the marginal cost of sending them free samples
is smaller. Hence, the structure of optimal targeted strategies is inherently linked to
the content of social interaction.
We next examine the eﬀects of the social interaction on proﬁts. We are interested in
two issues. One, we would like to understand the eﬀects of an increase in the level
and the dispersion of social interaction on proﬁts under targeted strategies. Two,
we would like to understand how the value of using targeted strategies as against
un-targeted strategies depends on social interaction. We will focus on the word of
mouth communication example, hereafter. Analogous results can be obtained in the
seeding the network example.23
The next result shows that ﬁrst order stochastic shifts in degree distribution increase
proﬁts.
Proposition 5.2 Consider the word of mouth communication example with targeted
strategies. If P 0 FOSD P, then proﬁts under P 0 are (weakly) higher than proﬁts under
P.
Proof: By Lemma 7.1 (in appendix) we know that θ(x∗) < 1 and therefore there
exists a cut-oﬀ ˜ k ∈ O such that x∗
k = 1 for all k < ˜ k, x∗
k = 0 for all k > ˜ k, and
x∗
˜ k ∈ [0,1].24 Next, consider P 0 and construct a decreasing cut-oﬀ strategy, call it x0,
as follows: deﬁne the cut-oﬀ ˜ k0 such that
P
k∈O P 0(k)x0
k = θ(x∗). Since θ(x∗) < 1
23The results for the seeding the network model are available from the authors upon request.
24Here we are suppressing the subscript P in the notation for optimal strategy for degree k, for
expositional simplicity.
19it is always possible to construct such a targeted strategy x0. Furthermore, since P 0
FOSD P either ˜ k < ˜ k0 or ˜ k = ˜ k0 and x˜ k ≤ x0
˜ k0.
































Deﬁne for each k ∈ O, g(k) =
P(k)(1−xk)
1−θ(x∗) and g0(k) =
P0(k)(1−x0
k)
1−θ(x∗) ; by construction, g














P(k)(1 − xk). (6)
Now note that for s < ˜ k0, the LHS of the inequality is equal to zero, while the RHS






k=1 P(k)xk. This taken along with the hypothesis that P 0 ﬁrst order
dominates P implies that P0(s) − θ ≤ P(s) − θ. Thus g0 ﬁrst order dominates g
and since (1 − θ)k is strictly falling in k, for θ ∈ (0,1), the claim follows. Since
Π(x0|P 0) − Π(x|P) ≥ 0 it follows that the monopolist will obtain (weakly) higher
proﬁts with the optimal strategy under P 0 as well. .
Proposition 5.2 is in line with the result we have obtained for the case of un-targeted
strategies (c.f. Proposition 3.1). Hence, we cannot say anything about the eﬀects of
greater word of mouth communication on the advantages of using targeted strategies
(as against un-targeted strategy). Indeed, the following example shows that such
eﬀects are non-monotonic. Suppose that α = 1 and that P(1) = p, while P(2) = 1−p.
Figure 2 plots the percentage value of targeting for diﬀerent degree distributions, i.e.,
[Π(x∗|p)−Π(x∗|p)]/Π(x∗|p), for p ∈ [0,1]. Note that by decreasing p we are taking ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance shifts in the degree distribution. So, Figure 3 shows that
the value of using targeted strategies as against un-targeted strategies might not be
monotonic in the level of social interaction. In this particular example the advantage
of targeted strategies is the highest, roughly 9%, when the average connectivity is
1.3.
We now turn to a more systematic study of the advantages of targeted strategies. Let
Π(x∗|P) and Π(x∗|P) be maximum proﬁts under un-targeted and targeted strategies,
respectively.
20Proposition 5.3 Consider the word of mouth communication example and ﬁx some
P(·). If P(·) assigns positive probability to two or more degrees in O, then Π(x∗|P) <
Π(x∗|P).
Proof: Start with the optimal untargeted strategy under P, say x; we know that x ∈



























Let us deﬁne g0(k) =
P(k)(1−x0
k)
1−x , for each k ∈ O. By construction of x0 it follows
that g0 : O → [0,1] is a probability distribution. Denote by G0(s) =
Ps
k=1 g0(k) its
cumulative distribution. It is possible to check, using a variation on the argument
in Proposition 5.1, that G0(s) ≤ P(s) for all s ∈ O and that for some s ∈ O the
inequality is strict. We use the hypothesis that P assigns positive probability to two
or more degrees to ensure the strict inequality for some s. That is, g0 FOSD P; since
(1 − x)k is strictly decreasing in k, the claim follows. Since the monopolist obtains
strictly higher proﬁts by using x0, she will also obtain strictly higher proﬁts under an
optimal targeted strategy. This completes the proof. 
Not surprisingly, Proposition 5.3 shows that targeted strategies strictly increase ﬁrm’s
proﬁts relative to un-targeted strategies. This result obtains whenever P assigns
positive probability to two or more degrees; for otherwise, there is not diﬀerence
between a targeted and an un-targeted strategy. While this is a straightforward
remark, it suggests more generally that a greater dispersion in the distribution of
connections favors the use of targeted strategies.
We examine this idea formally by studying the eﬀect on optimal proﬁts of simple
mean preserving spread shifts in degree distribution. We say that P 0 is a simple
mean preserving spread of P if P 0 is a mean preserving spread of P and there exists
only one k∗ ∈ O \ {1,¯ k} such that P0(s) ≥ P(s) for all s < k∗ and P0(s) ≤ P(s) for
all s ≥ k∗.
Proposition 5.4 Consider the word of mouth communication with targeted strate-
gies. If P 0 is a simple mean preserving spread of P, then there exists a α∗ > 0 such
that for all α < α∗, proﬁts under P 0 are (weakly) higher than proﬁts under P.
Proof. Suppose that P 0 is a simple mean preserving spread of P. Then there exists
a k∗ ∈ O \ {1,¯ k} such that P0(s) ≥ P(s) for all s < k∗ and P0(s) ≤ P(s) for all
21s ≥ k∗. Let x∗ be the optimal targeted strategy under P and let ˜ k be the cut-oﬀ of
this strategy. Lemma 7.1 implies that there exists a α∗ > 0 such that if α < α∗ then




k = θ(x∗). Let ˜ k0 be the cut-oﬀ under x0. Since ˜ k > k∗
and since P 0 is a simple mean preserving spread of P it follows that either ˜ k0 > ˜ k or
˜ k0 = ˜ k and x∗
˜ k < x0
˜ k0.
Now note that Π(x0|P 0) − Π(x∗|P) ≥ 0 if and only if condition (5) holds. To show
this, deﬁne g and g0 as in proposition 5.2. It is suﬃcient to show that g0 ﬁrst order
stochastic dominates g0; this is true if and only if condition (6) holds. Note that for all
s < ˜ k0 the LHS of that inequality is equal to zero, while the RHS is non-negative, so
the inequality is clearly satisﬁed. For s > ˜ k0,
Ps
k=1 P 0(k)x0




Thus, for all s > ˜ k0, condition (6) holds if and only if P0(s) ≤ P(s), which follows
by the hypothesis that P 0 is a simple mean preserving spread of P together with the
fact that k∗ < ˜ k. Since g0 FOSD g and since (1 − θ(x∗))k is strictly falling in k, the
claim follows. Since Π(x0|P 0) ≥ Π(x∗|P) it follows that the monopolist will obtain
(weakly) higher proﬁts with the optimal strategy under P 0 as well.
Proposition 5.4 establishes that under targeted strategies, greatear dispersion in con-
nections increases ﬁrm’s proﬁts when advertising is relatively inexpensive. Recall that
when the monopolist cannot target her strategy she is worse oﬀ when social inter-
action is more dispersed (c.f. Proposition 4.4). It then follows that for suﬃciently
low costs of advertising, the value of targeting is increasing in the dispersion of social
interaction: in the presence of very unequal degree distributions, player M is willing
to pay more for details of network information.25
We now elaborate on why greater dispersion in connections has contrasting eﬀects
on proﬁts under targeted and un-targeted strategies. A mean preserving spread shift
augments the fraction of consumers with low degree, while it increases the fraction
of consumers with high degree. Under un-targeted strategies the ﬁrst eﬀect decreases
proﬁts, while the latter increases proﬁts. Since marginal returns are decreasing in
degree, the former eﬀect dominates and consequently proﬁts goes down. In contrast,
under targeted strategies the monopolist informs most of the low degree consumers
and this alleviates the negative eﬀect induced by the increase of dispersion in connec-
tions. Speciﬁcally, if the monopolist targets suﬃciently enough low degree consumers,
which will be the case when advertising is relatively inexpensive, greater dispersion
increases proﬁts.
Indeed, the result in Proposition 5.4 is tight in the sense that if the costs of advertising
are suﬃciently high it is easy to construct examples where mean preserving shifts
25To ﬁx ideas, suppose that α = 1 and consider a shift from a distribution in which all individuals
have degree 2 to a new distribution in which individuals have either degree 1 or degree 3 with equal
probability. Such a shift increases the value of targeting from zero to 10%.
22in degree distributions decrease the proﬁts under targeted strategies as well as the
relative value of targeting. To see this suppose that α = 100, and that P(1) =
P(3) = β and P(2) = 1−2β, β ∈ [0.03,0.5]. Note that an increase in β is equivalent
to a simple mean preserving spread shifts in degree distribution. Figure 3 plots the
relative value of targeting, Π(x∗|β)−Π(x∗|β), for diﬀerent values of β ∈ [0.03,0.5].26
As said, in contrast with the case of low advertising costs, when costs of advertising
are high, the value of targeting may be lower in more dispersed networks.
5.2 Inﬂuencers
We have so far studied a setting in which heterogeneity in social interaction is reﬂected
in the idea that some individuals are more susceptible to social inﬂuence as compared
to others. In the marketing and social communication literatures a great deal of
attention has focussed on opinion leaders or inﬂuencers.27 In our setting a natural
way to model opinion leaders is to suppose that some individuals are sampled more
often as compared to others. In this section, we will study a model in which every
individual draws a sample of the same size, but some individuals are drawn more
than others.28 We will ﬁrst study the case of un-targeted strategies and then turn to
targeted strategies. The discussion will be carried out within the framework of the
word of mouth communication example.29
Let I = {1,...,¯ l} and let H : O → [0,1], be a probability distribution, where H(l)
indicates the fraction of individuals in N who are sampled by l others. The mean of H
will be denoted by ˆ l =
P
l∈I H(l)l. If an individual is sampled by l other individuals
this means that there are l “links” pointing to individual i. We will refer to this as
the in-degree and, in this framework, it represents how much individual i inﬂuences
others.
26It is easy to show that if β ∈ [0,0.03), then an increase in β increases the value of targeting,
which is in line with the intuition sketched above.
27Inﬂuencers may be said to be the people that friends, family and acquaintances turn to for
information about what to buy, what to read, how to invest and how to vote. The ideas of inﬂuencers
and opinion leaders ﬁgure prominently in the popular press. For instance, in a survey taken in the
year 2003, the newspaper Washington Post reported that inﬂuencers constitute only 10% of the
population and that they shape the attitudes and behavior of the other 90%. See e.g., Rogers (2003)
and Kotler and Armstrong (2004) for a general discussion on the importance of opinion leaders and
inﬂuencers.
28A major issue in the design of peer-leader network intervention policies is to identify the inﬂu-
encers. A general practice is to submit questionnaires to members of the targeted group. Subjects
are asked, among other things, to answer questions about their social network such as to nominate
their best friends, to nominate other individuals with whom they talk about speciﬁc issues, etc.
Individuals who receive more nominations from others are identiﬁed as network leaders. In turn,
network leaders are asked to attend training section and then they are asked to spread what they
have learnt to their acquaintances. See Kelly et al.(1991) and Valente et al. (2003) for a detailed
discussion of the implementation of these policies.
29A similar analysis for the seeding the network example is available from the authors upon request.
23We note that P and H satisfy the condition ˆ l = ˆ k. For simplicity we focus on the
case where P(ˆ k) = 1, in other words everyone draws a sample of the same size.
Example 5.3 Word of mouth communication, continued
For a given untargeted strategy x ∈ [0,1], the expected net proﬁts of the monopolist
are:






An inspection of the payoﬀs above reveals that when comparing two distributions
H and H0 the only factor that matters is the average in-degree. For example if H0
ﬁrst order stochastic dominates H, then ˆ l0 = ˆ k0 ≥ ˆ l = ˆ k. This immediately implies
from equation (7) that in the word of mouth communication example proﬁts under
H0 are higher than proﬁts under H. This ﬁnding is consistent with Proposition 4.2.
We next observe that since only the average in-degree is relevant, a mean preserving
spread in the in-degree distribution H has no eﬀect on proﬁts; this ﬁnding is in sharp
contrast to Proposition 4.4. Recall that in the basic model, greater dispersion in
social interaction lowers proﬁts in the word of mouth communication example!
We conclude by studying the optimal targeted strategy in this setting. Let a targeted
strategy be denoted by x = {x1,x2,...,x¯ l}, where xl is the eﬀort that the monopolist
targets to consumers that are sampled by l other consumers.
Let us denote by ˜ H(l), the probability that a consumer i samples a consumer who





The following result characterizes the optimal strategy of M when she can target
consumers with diﬀerent in-degree.
Proposition 5.5 In the word of mouth communication model with in-degree hetero-
geneity, the optimal targeted strategy is an increasing cut-oﬀ strategy.
Proof: Given a targeted strategy x, let ω(x) =
P
l∈I ˜ H(l)xl. The expected net
payoﬀs to the monopolist from strategy x are:
Π(x|H) = 1 −
X
l∈I












ˆ l + s
X
l∈I
H(l)(1 − xl)(1 − ω(x))
ˆ l−1 − αθ(x)
#
.
24Notice that within the brackets only the second term diﬀers across the diﬀerent in-
degree consumers. In particular the second term is increasing in the in-degree of
the consumer. Now consider the case that there is some s and some xs > 0 such
that
dΠ(x,|H)
dxs ≥ 0. It then follows directly from the above observation that the total
derivative will be strictly positive at xs0 = xs for all s0 ≥ s, and therefore xs0 = 1. 
In this example note that, by assumption, the size of the sample that each consumer
draws is the same, and so the probability that a consumer is informed by word of
mouth communication is constant across consumers. Hence, more inﬂuential con-
sumers are the natural target for the monopolist. More generally, one could allow
that consumers are heterogeneous in their susceptibility to social inﬂuence as well as
their degree of inﬂuencing others. Our ﬁndings point out that these two dimensions
might have diﬀerent implications for the design of eﬀective strategies.30
6 Conclusion
A broad range of work in economics, as well as in other disciplines, such as marketing
and social psychology, suggests that friends, neighbors and acquaintances, play an
important role is shaping individual behavior. In recent years, ﬁrms, governments
and political parties have increasingly tried to incorporate such social eﬀects in the
design of their marketing and development strategies. To the best of our knowledge
there is no theoretical model which examines the eﬀects of social inﬂuence on the
design of optimal strategies.
The main contribution of the paper has been to introduce a framework within which
this question can be systematically studied. Our analysis has focussed on the case of
a single player, and our analysis brings out three general points. First, we show that
incorporating information on social interaction can have large eﬀects on the proﬁts
of a player. Thus it is important for ﬁrms and governments to take social interaction
seriously. Second, we show that an increase in the level and dispersion of social
interaction can increase or decrease the strategy and proﬁts of the player; the eﬀect
depends on the content of the interaction. Therefore players should pay attention
to the type of interaction as well as the level of social interaction in designing their
strategies. Third, we show that the dispersion of connections determines the value of
additional information on connections. This means that the player should be willing
to pay more to learn the details of the network in contexts with greater dispersion in
social connections. We have also illustrated the economic content of these results via a
detailed discussion of two economic applications: optimal advertising in the presence
30We remark that in the seeding the network model with inﬂuence heterogeneity, the optimal
strategy is to target individuals with higher in-degree, as they are the one that are more likely to
trigger adoption. Hence, in the case of adoption externalities, the preferred individuals to distribute
the new product are those who are observed by many others and observe many others.
25of word of mouth communication and optimal seeding strategies in the presence of
adoption externalities.
This paper has focussed on the case in which there is only one player external to
the network. In many situations, it is more natural to consider multiple players.
For example, these players could be ﬁrms competing for consumers or developmental
agencies conducting complementary social programmes. The presence of multiple
players introduces a new key element into the problem, namely the nature of payoﬀ
externalities between external players. For preliminary results with two or more
players, see our companion paper Galeotti and Goyal (2006). Moreover, the model
we study is essentially static. Generally, diﬀerent content of social interaction as well
as a diﬀerent distribution of connections will lead to diﬀerent dynamics of diﬀusion
and therefore to diﬀerent dynamically optimal diﬀusion strategies. In on-going work
we are exploring the dynamics of diﬀusion.
7 Appendix
Lemma 7.1 Consider the word of mouth communication example with targeted strate-
gies. For every ﬁnite α > 0 the optimal strategy x∗
P is such that θ(x∗
P) ∈ (0,1).
Furthermore, if α increases then θ(x∗
P) (weakly) decreases. Finally, if α tends to zero
then θ(x∗
P) tends to one, if α tends to inﬁnity then θ(x∗
P) tends to zero.
Proof. Fix α > 0. We ﬁrst show that θ(x∗
P) ∈ (0,1). Suppose that θ(x∗
P) = 0,
then x∗





1 + ˆ k

> 0, for all s ∈ O, and
therefore aggregate proﬁts can be strictly increased relative to x∗
P. This contradicts
the hypothesis that x∗
P is optimal. Similarly, suppose now that θ(x∗
P) = 1, then
x∗
s = 1 for all s. Notice that
dΠ(x∗
P|P)
dxs = −P(s)α < 0, for all s ∈ O, which contradicts
the hypothesis that x∗
P is optimal.
Next, consider α0 > α > 0 and let x
0
P and xP be the optimal targeted strategies
under α0 and α, respectively. Let ˜ k the cut-oﬀ under strategy xP. We show that
θ(x0
P) ≤ θ(xP). Suppose that θ(x0
P) > θ(xP); this together with the fact that x
0
P
and xP are decreasing cut-oﬀ strategies imply that x0
˜ k > x˜ k. Notice that
dΠ(x|P)
dxs is
decreasing in α and θ(x) for all s ∈ O and for all θ(x) ∈ (0,1). This contradicts that
under α0 the optimal targeted strategy is such that x0
˜ k > x˜ k. It is easy to verify the
remaining part of the lemma.
Appendix A: Word of mouth communication about product quality
Here we present a model in which there is asymmetric information between ﬁrms
and consumers about quality and consumers share their experience about product
26quality via word of mouth communication.31 As before, suppose that there is one
ﬁrm which is selling to a set of consumers. The set of buyers is N = [0,1]; each buyer
has inelastic demand and her reservation value for the object is v = 1 if the quality
is HIGH, but the reservation utility v = 0 if the quality is LOW. At the start all
consumers are pessimistic about the quality so that no one is willing to pay a positive
price. Hence, the only way the ﬁrm can generate sales is to give away free samples
of the product, and hope that the consumers will pass on good information about
the product. Consider a two period model, where in period 1 the ﬁrm chooses the
number of samples to give away for free x ∈ [0,1], and in period 2 it chooses the price
to charge, p ≥ 0. Moreover, to simplify matters, suppose that there are no direct
costs of producing the good, which implies that the only cost is an indirect one, via
the loss of potential sales. Given that consumers only buy if they are informed that
the product is HIGH, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to set price p = 1 in the second period.
We assume this in what follows.
The payoﬀs to a ﬁrm from a consumer with degree k, are then given by
φk(x) = (1 − x)[1 − (1 − x)
k].
Notice that (1−x) refers to the probability that a consumers has not been given the
product for free in period 1. It is easy to check that φk(x) is concave in x and it is
increasing and concave in k. These properties correspond to the properties obtained in
the optimal advertising with word of mouth communication about product existence.
For a given distribution, P, we can write the expected proﬁts under strategy x as:
Π(x|P) = (1 − x)
X
k∈O
P(k)[1 − (1 − x)
k]
The monopolist chooses x to maximize proﬁts. It follows that there is a unique
solution to this optimization problem and that this solution is interior. The eﬀects of
changes in P on the optimal strategy depend on how marginal returns change with
respect to k. It is easy to check that these relations are as in the case when word of
mouth communication is with regard to existence of product. 
Appendix B: Individual heterogeneity
This section shows how heterogenous social inﬂuence is diﬀerent from a standard
form of individual heterogeneity with regard to willingness to pay. For illustration
31In a recent paper, Navarro (2006) also studies the role of word of mouth communication in a
model of asymmetric information about product quality. Her interest is in the aﬀects of word of
mouth communication in mitigating the ineﬃciencies generated by asymmetric information. She
focuses on the use of prices by ﬁrms and free riding in experimentation by ﬁrms. By contrast, our
interest is in the impact of word of mouth communication on optimal advertising and the proﬁts of
the ﬁrm.
27suppose there is a unit measure of consumers and that they demand a single unit of a
good; they diﬀer only in their willingness to pay for it. This heterogeneity is reﬂected
in a distribution P(.), where P(k) is the fraction of consumers who are willing to
pay k for the good. Suppose that the ﬁrm knows this distribution and sets a price
p ∈ {1,2....¯ k}. It then follows that the expected proﬁts for the ﬁrm with price p and





















and if (C.1) holds then the optimal strategy is (weakly) increasing with ﬁrst order
shifts in willingness to pay. This is in contrast to the result in the word of mouth
communication example; recall from Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 4.1 that the eﬀects
of increasing social interaction depend on the costs of advertising. For low costs of
advertising a ﬁrst order shift in social interaction actually implies a lowering in the
level of advertising. This diﬀerence in results arises out of the substitutes relation
between social connections and advertising at low costs of advertising.
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